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Abstract:  
This paper seeks to identify and examine the extent to which there are substantive 
differences between the common law and equitable tests for non-contractual mistaken 
transfers. As the title suggests, the discussion references the case of Pitt v Holt as 
invoking the analogy of law and equity being ‘pitted’ against each other. 
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Introduction 
In his well-known article making the case for greater fusion between common law and 
equity, Andrew Burrows divided English law into three categories.2 Firstly, there are 
those areas where both the substantive and terminological differences between law 
and equity are useful: Burrows’ leading example here is the trust, a concept which, he 
notes, is difficult if not impossible to describe without resorting to the law-equity 
division. Secondly, there are those areas where the substantive differences are useful 
but where nothing is gained by retaining the labels of common law and equity. Here, 
Burrows cites duress at law and undue influence in equity as an example of useful, 
complementary concepts which gain nothing from still being pinned to their historical 
origins.3 Finally, Burrows’ third category comprises those areas where law and equity 
are pitted against one another: their rules are either not coherent with each other or 
are actively contradictory. The aim of this paper is to examine one particular area of 
the law to decide which category it falls into and, should the third of Burrows’ categories 
be the most apt, to consider how it might be reformed. 
 
The particular area of law under discussion here is the circumstances when a court will 
allow a claimant to reverse a unilateral, non-contractual transfer or to subsequently 
                                                 
1 Tom Graham studied the Graduate Diploma in Law at the University of Plymouth in 2017-8 
having previously completed a DPhil in medieval history. He is currently enduring the Legal 
Practice Course before starting a training contract with Stephens Scown LLP in 2019. 
2 Burrows A., ‘We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity’, (2002) 22:1 OJLS 1 at 5-7. 
3 Although note that this viewpoint is not universal: see e.g. Millett P., ‘Equity's place in the 
law of commerce’, (1998) 114 LQR 214 at 219. 
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recover value from the defendant on the grounds of mistake.4 At common law, this is 
generally now analysed as a function of the law of unjust enrichment: the defendant is 
enriched at the claimant’s expense, and the mistake serves to make that enrichment 
unjust, since the claimant did not truly intend the defendant to be enriched.5 The 
claimant can thus seek restitution of the value of the enrichment. In equity, however, 
this situation is analysed differently and leads to a different remedy: a sufficiently 
serious mistake will make it unconscionable for the defendant to retain what was given 
to him and so the court has a discretion to order rescission to unwind the transaction.6 
The equitable jurisdiction is, moreover, thought to be limited to only voluntary 
transactions, whereas the common law is generally invoked in the situations where the 
claimant mistakenly thought he was obliged to make the transfer. A particular 
difference between the two approaches is the type of mistake which is necessary to 
support a claim. If the claimant’s action seeks a remedy at law in unjust enrichment, 
the mistake need only to have caused the payment (and thus the defendant’s 
enrichment).7 By contrast, the test in equity, reformulated by Lord Walker in Pitt v Holt, 
is that the mistake must have been so ‘serious’ that it will cause ‘injustice (or unfairness 
or unconscionableness)’ if left uncorrected.8 The remainder of this paper is dedicated 
to analysing the basis of this difference between law and equity, and to considering 
whether the different tests are justified. We will start by considering the decision in Pitt 
v Holt in an effort to understand the function and purpose of the more complex and 
stringent test in equity. 
 
1 The Case of Pitt v Holt 
Like almost every modern case concerning equitable mistake, Pitt related to a 
transaction which had produced unexpected adverse tax consequences. Mr Pitt had 
suffered incapacitating head injuries in a road traffic accident and received a settlement 
of £1.2m after compromising his action for damages. Mrs Pitt (as her husband’s Court 
of Protection-appointed receiver) took professional advice on how to structure this 
settlement to minimise tax liabilities, but her advisers neglected to consider the 
                                                 
4 This paper will only briefly touch upon the concept of mistake as a vitiating factor in 
contracts: for this see Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 and Great Peace Shipping Ltd 
v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407.  
5 See e.g. Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677; 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349; Deutsche Morgan Grenfell 
Group Plc v IRC [2006] UKHL 49. 
6 Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26 
7 The test was formulated by Robert Goff J in Barclays Bank v Simms and has since been 
confirmed several times by the House of Lords and Supreme Court (e.g. in Kleinwort Benson 
and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell). 
8 Lord Walker in Pitt at [126] 
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inheritance tax implications. This omission was particularly unfortunate in the 
circumstances, since section 89 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 provides a special 
regime whereby trusts for disabled people can be structured so as to avoid any IHT 
liability. As such, when Mr Pitt’s death led to a six-figure IHT assessment, Mrs Pitt 
sought a court order to unwind the settlement. 
 
At first instance, Mrs Pitt succeeded under the so-called ‘rule in Hastings-Bass’, which 
was then thought to allow a court to reverse a disposition by trustees if they had failed 
to consider something which they should have considered, or considered something 
which they should not.9 HMRC, however, appealed the decision, and in the Court of 
Appeal Pitt was joined with another appeal concerning the rule in Hastings-Bass.10 
This second case, Futter v Futter, related to the trustees of some discretionary family 
trusts who had received incorrect professional advice about tax liabilities and had 
thereby incurred a significant capital gains tax liability. In a lengthy judgment, Lloyd LJ 
examined the origins of the rule in Hastings-Bass and concluded that the purported 
rule was not supported by authority: this was sufficient to allow HMRC’s appeal in 
Futter, but Pitt had been pleaded on the alternative ground of equitable mistake. After 
again surveying the authorities, Lloyd LJ held that rescission for equitable mistake was 
not available if the mistake was as to the consequences of the transaction: as the 
mistake in Pitt concerned the tax consequences, the equitable mistake argument was 
also dismissed and HMRC’s appeal allowed. Both Futter and Pitt were then appealed 
to the Supreme Court. 
 
Although a panel of seven was convened to hear the case, the only judgment was 
given by Lord Walker. His Lordship first considered the rule in Hastings-Bass, coming 
to the same conclusion as the court below. In short, the ratio of Re Hastings-Bass itself 
was concerned with trustees exceeding their powers, rather than making inadequate 
deliberations. The latter ‘rule’ had emerged from a misinterpretation of Re Hastings-
Bass in Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans, but it required that the trustees’ 
deliberations fell so short of what was expected as to be a breach of trust.11 As the 
trustees in Futter and Mrs Pitt in Pitt had both taken appropriate professional advice, 
their deliberations could not be held to be inadequate: both appeals therefore failed on 
this head. 
                                                 
9 Re Hastings-Bass [1975] Ch 25. This ‘rule’ was extended by analogy to Mrs Pitt’s position 
as a receiver appointed by the Court of Protection, as that role has similar fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
10 Pitt v Holt [2011] EWCA Civ 197. 
11 Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587. 
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On equitable mistake, however, Lord Walker took a different view from Lloyd LJ and 
therefore allowed the appeal in Pitt. The judgments of Lloyd LJ and Lord Walker both 
centred on two competing lines of authority as to when mistake might be successfully 
pleaded in equity. The first of these was the Ogilvie litigation of the late-nineteenth 
century, in which a wealthy widow sought to set aside two deeds by which she had 
established charitable foundations. Although the case reached the House of Lords, the 
most significant judgment was that of Lindley LJ in the Court of Appeal, as he laid down 
the following statement of principle: 
 
In the absence of all circumstances of suspicion [i.e. fraud, undue 
influence etc] a donor can only obtain back property which he has 
given away by showing that he was under some mistake of so 
serious a character as to render it unjust on the part of the donee to 
retain the property given to him.12 
 
The second line of authority considered by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court in Pitt originated in the influential modern case of Gibbon v Mitchell.13 Here, 
Millett J had distinguished between mistakes as to the effect of a voluntary disposition 
and mistakes as to its consequences, holding that the former could ground a claim for 
rescission, but the latter would not. The origin of this rule is unclear: indeed, it appears 
to have been Millett J’s own ex tempore formulation, based on his analysis of a handful 
of nineteenth and early twentieth century cases. As noted by, inter alia, Lord Walker in 
Pitt and the editors of Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, there are two 
problems with the judgment in Gibbon. Firstly, the terms ‘effect’ and ‘consequence’ are 
arguably ambiguous, and some judges have found it difficult to draw a distinction 
between them in practice. Secondly, the Ogilvie litigation was not referred to in the 
judgment, nor cited before Millett J in argument.14 After Ogilvie was re-discovered by 
counsel in the later case of Sieff v Fox,15 first instance judges were left to grapple with 
two competing lines of authority, both of which were slightly doubtful: Ogilvie was a 
House of Lords decision, but dated to the late nineteenth century and had 
subsequently disappeared, while Gibbon was a modern case decided by one of the 
                                                 
12 Ogilvie v Littleboy (1897) 13 TLR 399 at 400. 
13 Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304. 
14 Lord Walker in Pitt at [116]-[123]; Mitchell C. et al (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (9th ed., 2016), 9-135. Between the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
judgments in Pitt, Lord Millett himself wrote a forceful (and, for the present author, persuasive) 
defence of his decision in Gibbon, arguing both that the difference between ‘effect’ and 
‘consequence’ was clear (and similar to the distinction between intent and motive in criminal 
law) and that it was entirely consistent with the decision in Ogilvie. Millett P., ‘Second 
Thoughts on Gibbon v Mitchell’, (2013) 19:2 Trusts & Trustees 124. 
15 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). 
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most respected equity lawyers of the era, but was only a first instance judgment. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that judges responded to this conflict in different ways, with some 
following Ogilvie,16 some following Gibbon,17 and others taking the more radical step 
of expressing sympathy with the idea of adopting the common law’s ‘causative mistake’ 
test.18 
 
Pitt v Holt was the Court of Appeal’s first opportunity to clarify the law, and Lloyd LJ 
chose to effectively combine the two tests. Firstly, he held, ‘there must be a mistake 
on the part of the donor either as to the legal effect of the disposition or as to an existing 
fact which is basic to the transaction’, but this mistake must also ‘be of sufficient gravity 
as to satisfy the Ogilvie v Littleboy test, which provides protection to the recipient 
against too ready an ability of the donor to seek to recall his gift.’ When Lord Walker 
examined this proposed test, he considered that the element requiring a mistake as to 
‘an existing fact which is basic to the transaction’ should be expanded to include a 
mistake of law (following the abolition of the mistake of law ‘bar’ in Kleinwort Benson v 
Lincoln City Council).19 Moreover, His Lordship held that, once expanded to include 
mistake of law, the first element of Lloyd LJ’s test was so wide as to add nothing to the 
test from Ogilvie. He therefore adopted the Ogilvie ‘serious mistake’ test as the correct 
measure for when the equitable jurisdiction to rescind mistaken transactions might be 
invoked, although added a modified form of the Gibbon test as additional guidance to 
judges about when a mistake would normally be sufficiently serious. 
 
2 Commentary 
Before concentrating on the possible justifications for Lord Walker’s stricter test for 
equitable mistake, it is worth noting that the judgment in Pitt can be criticised both in 
principle and for how it has worked in practice. In particular, Lord Walker’s 
endorsement of the concept of ‘seriousness’ has the potential to introduce significant 
uncertainty into this area of the law, since two judges’ ideas of what is sufficiently 
serious may, of course, differ significantly. This is exacerbated by Lord Walker’s 
insistence that judges employ ‘an intense focus…on the facts of the particular case’ 
when making decisions, which threatens to limit the development and application of 
                                                 
16 E.g. Re Griffiths [2008] EWHC 118 (Ch). 
17 Notably Pitt itself at first instance, where relief on the grounds of mistake was denied under 
the effect/consequence distinction from Gibbon: Pitt v Holt [2010] EWHC 45 (Ch). 
18 Fender v National Westminster Bank Plc [2008] EWHC 2242 (Ch). 
19 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349. 
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precedent, which might otherwise help the courts produce a more uniform definition of 
seriousness.20  
 
In practice, by contrast, the most dissatisfying aspect of the decision in Pitt v Holt is 
that it has failed to rebalance the consequences of poor trust and tax planning so that 
the bill is more often footed by incompetent professional advisers (via actions in 
professional negligence) rather than the taxpayer. This was one of the reasons why 
both Lloyd LJ and Lord Walker sought to cut back the ‘rule in Hastings-Bass’: it was, 
they believed, being used as a ‘soft option’ by trustees seeking to avoid the tax 
consequences of decisions which were later shown to have been misguided.21 
However, in the aftermath of Pitt, these cases have instead been pleaded on the 
grounds of equitable mistake and, seemingly without exception, the claimants have 
been able to persuade the court that their mistakes about tax consequences are 
sufficiently serious to ground rescission.22 There has also been little judicial discussion 
of Lord Walker’s obiter (and admittedly rather ambiguous) remarks about the possibility 
that equitable relief might be denied in cases of highly artificial attempts to avoid 
taxation.23 In short, it seems quite likely that the relationship between equitable mistake 
and incompetent administration of tax planning trusts is a subject which will require 
reconsideration by the higher courts in the near future. 
 
In the specific context of this paper, however, the critical aspect of the judgment in Pitt 
is that it forcefully reaffirms that the test which must be satisfied in order to invoke the 
equitable jurisdiction to correct mistaken transfers is stricter than the common law test 
of simple causation. It is noteworthy that Lord Walker’s judgment (which, we must 
recall, was unanimously endorsed by the other six Justices of the Supreme Court who 
heard the case) does not truly engage with this distinction, let alone attempt to justify 
it. In some respects this is surprising, given that the common law test was discussed 
as an analogy during argument (with counsel citing leading cases such as Kleinwort 
Benson and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Plc v IRC, as well as the seminal decision of 
Robert Goff J in Barclays Bank v WJ Simms) and also given Lord Walker’s previously 
expressed views which appear sympathetic to expanding the law of unjust enrichment 
                                                 
20 Lord Walker in Pitt at [126], echoing Lord Steyn in In re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47. 
21 E.g. Lord Walker in Pitt at [7].  
22 See e.g. Kennedy v Kennedy [2014] EWHC 4129 (Ch); Freedman v Freedman [2015] 
EWHC 1457 (Ch); Van der Merwe v Goldman [2016] EWHC 790 (Ch). Also Pedley S., 
‘Lessons learned from Kennedy v Kennedy’, [2015] 2 Private Client Business 66 
23 Lord Walker in Pitt at [135]. See also Lee J., ‘Tax, equity and artificiality’, (2017) 31:4 TLI 
219. 
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and increasing its internal consistency.24 The result is that it has been left to later 
commentators to address the question of why common law and equity should adopt 
different thresholds for when they will step in to correct a mistaken non-contractual 
transaction. Some have concluded that the difference is unsupportable: Birke Häcker, 
for instance, describes this is an area of the law where ‘the forms of action really do 
seem to rule us from their graves’.25 The solution according to Häcker is to extend the 
causative mistake test so that it applies to the equitable jurisdiction.26 Other 
commentators, by contrast, have accepted the different tests (often noting that arguing 
against the separate equitable test is pointless, since it has been reaffirmed so recently 
and forcefully by the Supreme Court) and have instead sought to explain the 
differences between them.27 In general, these scholars have then sought a justification 
for the different tests in two distinct but not necessarily mutually-exclusive places: that 
equity needs a stricter test because it offers a more powerful remedy, and that there is 
something special about voluntary transactions which means that it should only be 
possible to unwind them if the donor’s mistake was particularly serious. I shall discuss 
each of these arguments in turn. 
 
Firstly, it should be noted that there are some authorities which can be interpreted as 
endorsing the second of these possibilities. In Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, for instance, 
Lord Scott stated obiter his opinion that causative mistake alone ‘would not suffice’ to 
allow the recovery of a mistaken gift of money.28 The context of this case was a 
common law action in unjust enrichment, suggesting that Lord Scott did not believe 
that such an action would be possible in the case of a gift without imposing a stricter 
test than simple causative mistake. This is also the implication of the more recent case 
of Pagel v Farman, in which Farman (as Part 20 claimant) sought to recover the value 
of shares which he had gifted to Pagel.29 As this was an action to recover value rather 
than property in specie and there were no adverse tax consequences to avoid, it should 
have been possible to argue the case as a personal claim in unjust enrichment, and 
thus use the more liberal causative mistake test. Instead, counsel for both sides 
                                                 
24 E.g. on adopting the ‘absence of basis’ theory in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell at [150]-[158] 
and on the operation of the change of position defence in Derby v Scottish Equitable Plc 
[2001] EWCA Civ 369 at [45]-[48]. 
25 Häcker B., ‘Mistaken Gifts after Pitt v Holt’, (2014) 67 CLP 333, at 353, echoing F.W. 
Maitland. 
26 Ibid, 359-371.  
27 E.g. Goff & Jones at 9-144; Etherton T., ‘The Role of Equity in Mistaken Transactions’, 
(2013) 27:4 TLI 159; Watterson S., ‘Reversing Mistaken Voluntary Dispositions’, (2013) 72:3 
CLJ 501. 
28 Lord Scott in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell at [87]. 
29 Pagel v Farman [2013] UKHC 2210 (Comm). 
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accepted that the ‘serious mistake’ test from Pitt was applicable. As the editors of Goff 
& Jones point out, the choice of test was common ground between the parties rather 
than actually being argued and decided, and so Pagel is somewhat tenuous 
authority.30 However, when taken alongside Lord Scott’s dictum in Deutsche Morgan 
Grenfell, it must be noted that the debate over whether the stricter equitable test is 
justified by the available remedy or by the type of transaction may possibly have 
already been settled by the courts in favour of the latter. 
 
Personal and proprietary remedies 
As well as the different tests, the most obvious difference between the equitable and 
common law jurisdictions to reverse mistaken transactions is that the common law 
offers only a personal remedy: an unsuccessful defendant is ordered to disgorge his 
enrichment by paying restitutionary damages to the claimant. By contrast, the equitable 
remedy of rescission has the potential to be far more powerful because it acts to 
unwind the transaction (thus, inter alia, allowing recovery in specie, and sidestepping 
any unhelpful intervening events such as the defendant’s insolvency and assessments 
for taxation) rather than only allowing the claimant to recover the value of whatever 
was mistakenly transferred. Writing extra-judicially soon after the decision in Pitt, Sir 
Terence Etherton MR argued that the more powerful remedy was what justified the 
stricter equitable test for mistake.31 
 
At first sight, this explanation seems eminently plausible: it is a generally accepted 
principle of English law that the availability of proprietary relief should be restricted 
more than personal remedies such as damages.32 However, on closer examination 
there are issues with this argument which make it a less satisfying explanation of the 
different tests. Firstly, if the justification for the stricter equitable test is that it is required 
to restrict the availability of a proprietary remedy, rather than to restrict the possibility 
of recalling mistaken gifts more generally, then what is to prevent a mistaken donor 
from also pleading his case in unjust enrichment to take advantage of the more liberal 
causative mistake test? Consider, for instance, a situation where a claimant has gifted 
away some jewellery while labouring under a mistake, and where the claimant would 
not have made the transfer were he not mistaken. On discovering his mistake, our 
claimant sues the transferee and advances two alternative arguments in court: firstly, 
                                                 
30 Goff & Jones 9-149 
31 Etherton, ‘Role of Equity’. 
32 Good examples of this from different areas of law include conversion, the limits on specific 
performance, and the possibility of monetary payments being a just satisfaction of equities 
acquired through proprietary estoppel. 
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he submits that his mistake is so serious that the court should exercise its equitable 
discretion to order rescission and therefore allow him to recover the jewellery in specie. 
The court, however, disagrees that his mistake is sufficiently serious to ground 
rescission, and so the claimant falls back on his alternative argument: his mistake 
caused him to transfer the jewellery to the defendant, and so he is entitled to recover 
its value from the defendant at common law in unjust enrichment. Since the causative 
mistake test is clearly satisfied, the court concludes that he is entitled as of right to 
restitution of the value of the jewellery. 
 
The possibility that restitutionary damages may be available as an alternative remedy 
for a mistaken gift might appear directly analogous to the relationship between 
damages and specific performance in contract and to the possibility of specific 
recovery of converted goods, but there is a significant difference. In contract and 
conversion, the ingredient which must be present to persuade the court to order a 
proprietary remedy is related to the nature of the asset transferred under the contract 
or converted by the defendant: it must generally be unique or uniquely valuable to the 
claimant. The underlying principle is that the value of the asset cannot be truly 
expressed in terms of money, and so a proprietary remedy is necessary to do justice 
and properly compensate the claimant. By contrast, the distinction contemplated here 
regarding mistaken gifts relates to the subjective mindset of the claimant: was their 
mistake sufficiently serious? If we are to accept that this should be the decisive factor 
in determining whether a proprietary remedy should be available to the claimant, then 
we must surely have to identify some underlying principle which means that a 
proprietary remedy is required to fully compensate the claimant. Such a principle is not 
easy to find, as can be immediately demonstrated if we consider the same dilemma 
which the rule on the availability of specific performance is designed to address. A 
claimant might, for instance, make an undoubtedly serious mistake and yet transfer a 
type of non-unique property (such as commodities or publicly-traded shares) for which 
damages would be an entirely appropriate compensation: why is it then necessary to 
order rescission and recovery in specie? Conversely, a simple mistake might cause 
someone to gift away a unique item (imagine, for instance, that the jewellery in the 
example above was a family heirloom) for which damages would be inadequate 
compensation, yet no proprietary remedy would be available.  
 
One possible solution to this problem would be to treat the nature of property 
transferred as one of the factors used when calculating the ‘seriousness’ of the 
claimant’s mistake. But this does not answer the question of why a proprietary 
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response would be justified in cases where non-unique property is gifted away 
pursuant to a mistake which is considered sufficiently serious due to other factors (such 
as the impact of the transfer on the claimant himself). Another solution would be to 
apply the Pitt test to unjust enrichment actions to recover the value of property 
transferred voluntarily (as in Pagel), but this would break the link between the Pitt test 
and proprietary consequences, and instead suggest that the stricter test is required to 
offer an enhanced level of protection for voluntary transactions. 
 
As well as the question of why a mistaken donor should not be able to plead his case 
in unjust enrichment, Etherton’s proposal of a link between the serious mistake test 
and proprietary consequences also raises the opposite question: why is the equitable 
jurisdiction to order rescission not available in the case of the commercial ‘mistaken 
obligation’ payments which tend to be the subject of actions in unjust enrichment? If 
we accept the premise that a serious mistake justifies a proprietary response, how can 
we then argue that equity should not step in to rescind a transfer made by a claimant 
labouring under the seriously mistaken belief that he was obliged to make the transfer? 
The only plausible reason to then deny such a claimant would be that there is 
something special about voluntary transactions which allows the equitable jurisdiction 
to be invoked, which would again break the link between the test and the proprietary 
consequences. The alternative is to follow the logic of the argument and accept a three-
tiered hierarchy of mistakes universal to all non-contractual contexts. Firstly, there are 
those mistakes which are so serious as to prevent legal title to assets ever passing 
(i.e. mistakes as to the identity of the donee or the asset being transferred).33 Next, 
there are those mistakes which satisfy the Pitt test of seriousness: in these 
circumstances, the court would allow the transferor to set aside the transaction. Finally, 
there are merely causative mistakes, which would allow the recovery of the value of 
the assets transferred.34  
 
This is certainly a pleasingly neat structure which creates a unified system for 
approaching non-contractual mistaken transactions and arguably brings the common 
law and equity into harmony. In practical terms, adopting this structure would probably 
                                                 
33 R v Middleton (1873) LR 2 CCC 38; R v Ashwell (1885) 16 QBD 190; Ilich v R (1987) 162 
CLR 110. Note that the decisions in these cases and thus the authority they provide for the 
effects of these types of ‘fundamental’ mistake have been powerfully questioned by William 
Swadling: Swadling W., ‘Unjust Delivery’, in Burrows A. & Roger A. (eds), Mapping the Law: 
Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford, 2006) pp. 277-298. 
34 Etherton himself notes the additional possibility that certain mistakes could be cured 
through the equitable jurisdiction to rectify documents, but this is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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not result in much change in how mistaken voluntary transfers are litigated: the 
overwhelming majority of mistaken voluntary transfers which come before the courts 
are cases where incompetent trust planning has produced adverse tax consequences, 
and so seeking a personal remedy against trustees would be mostly pointless.35 
Making rescission available in mistaken obligations cases could make a significant 
difference. Generally, these cases are brought by commercial claimants seeking 
restitution of money paid in satisfaction of an obligation which they believe they owe 
due to a mistake of fact (such as a bank mistakenly believing it had authority to honour 
a cheque)36 or law (such as a bank mistakenly believing that a local authority was 
empowered to enter an interest rate swap).37 As such, the availability of rescission 
would often be irrelevant, since the claimant is seeking the return of value rather than 
property in specie, and there are no taxation consequences to consider. However, 
there is a very significant exception: the proprietary consequences of rescission would 
be extremely attractive to a claimant seeking to recover money mistakenly transferred 
to an insolvent defendant, since it would give priority over other creditors.  
 
This would not necessarily be an unwelcome development, so long as mistakes about 
the solvency of the transferee were never allowed to qualify. It would probably also be 
necessary to draw a distinction between those transferors who had genuinely chosen 
to enter commercial relations with the transferee on those terms (and thus chosen to 
risk the transferee’s insolvency to that extent) and those who had mistakenly felt 
obliged to make the payment. For example, in Kleinwort Benson the claimant bank had 
deliberately chosen to enter a contract with the defendant on the agreed terms and 
thus had chosen to take the commercial risk of the defendant becoming insolvent: the 
later discovery that the contract was void ab initio was nothing more than a helpful 
opportunity to escape a bad deal. By contrast, in Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-
British Bank the claimant bank paid the defendant in the mistaken belief that it had not 
already done so: Chase Manhattan thereby became exposed to the defendant’s 
insolvency when it had not chosen to take that risk.38 Assuming for sake of argument 
that their mistakes were equally serious, it would surely be more just and fair for Chase 
Manhattan to take priority over other creditors than it would for Kleinwort Benson. 
Allowing the possibility of rescission in these circumstances would also arguably be a 
better way to introduce proprietary remedies for mistaken payments in the commercial 
                                                 
35 In the case of Pitt itself, it would have allowed Mrs Pitt to recover the tiny amount of money 
left in her husband’s settlement, but would not have avoided the inheritance tax. 
36 Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677. 
37 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349. 
38 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch. 105. 
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sphere than the methods attempted by the courts in the past, since it would do far less 
violence to established trust law principles than, for instance, the decision to impose a 
resulting trust in Chase Manhattan.39 
 
Extending the equitable jurisdiction to order rescission so that it encompasses all non-
contractual mistaken transfers would bring into sharp relief the nagging question posed 
earlier: why should the ‘seriousness’ of the claimant’s mistake determine whether the 
court should award a personal or a proprietary remedy? Unless a principled 
explanation can be found to answer this question, it is ultimately difficult to accept that 
the reason for equity’s stricter test is the potential to award a more powerful remedy. 
 
Voluntary transfers as a special category 
The second argument advanced to justify the stricter equitable test for mistake is that 
the equitable jurisdiction applies only to voluntary transfers, and that there is something 
special about such transfers which makes it appropriate to give them greater 
protection. A parallel is often drawn with contracts: ‘Conceptually, it amounts to saying 
that “gift” is a legal basis or justification for the transfer, in the same way that a valid 
contract is prima facie a justification for the recipient retaining what she has received 
in pursuance of it. If the transferor wants to recover, he has to invalidate the legal basis 
first.’40 There are two questions to answer here: why, as a matter of principle, gifts and 
other voluntary transactions need greater protection, and how to give them that 
protection in practice. The first question is quite simply answered: recipients should not 
generally have to worry about a donor revoking a gift and, just as the law seeks to hold 
contracting parties to their bargains, so too should it prevent donors from too easily 
acting upon second thoughts. This is so obvious a moral principle as to require little 
explanation, although one scholar has nonetheless drawn on anthropological studies 
to produce a rather complex model of how gifts operate in a ‘moral economy’ and 
therefore deserve as much legal protection as their contractual equivalents in the 
‘market economy’.41 
 
The more complex issue is whether the causative mistake test is sufficient to provide 
the necessary protection for recipients of gifts and other voluntary transactions: if so, 
we could simply extend that test to the equitable jurisdiction and resolve much of the 
                                                 
39 For criticism of this decision see e.g. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 714-715. 
40 Häcker, ‘Mistaken Gifts’ 341. 
41 Tang H.W., ‘Restitution for Mistaken Gifts’, (2004) 20:1 Journal of Contract Law 1. 
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friction between law and equity in one stroke. Birke Häcker, for instance, has argued 
that the causative mistake test is indeed sufficient, since unjust enrichment’s ‘change 
of position’ defence will act to protect a donee who has relied on the gift in some way, 
thus avoiding any injustice.42 However, this is not persuasive: can it really be said to 
be fair that only donees who have relied on the gift should be protected? As Häcker 
herself acknowledges, the courts would probably have to deny some claims on the 
basis that allowing the claimant to rely on his mistake would be contrary to public policy 
or else somehow morally objectionable.43 The example Häcker gives is Lord Walker’s 
suggestion that the courts might not assist aggressive tax avoidance schemes, but it 
seems likely that any such category would also include, for instance, the oft-cited 
example of the homophobic uncle who tries to revoke a gift upon discovering his 
nephew’s sexuality. The result would be to entirely compromise the simplicity of the 
causative mistake test by introducing a large and ill-defined area of judicial discretion, 
since this ‘public policy’ exception would have to be judged on the facts of individual 
cases and, moreover, would fluctuate as public mores and morals shifted. Ultimately, 
therefore, the causative mistake test does not provide us with a satisfactory tool for 
determining whether a gift should be revocable because our moral faculties impress 
on us that only some mistakes should be ‘good enough’ to make revoking a gift 
legitimate and fair. 
 
This in turn explains why the causative mistake test appears entirely appropriate in 
mistaken obligations cases but not for mistaken gifts. It is submitted that applying the 
causative mistake test to mistaken gifts is a form of category error, and that it is best 
exposed by adopting the ‘absence of basis’ language associated with unjust 
enrichment in civilian systems.44 In short, the causative mistake test works in the 
context of mistaken obligations because in these cases there is plainly no basis for the 
defendant’s enrichment. The test then simply supplies a means of checking factual 
causation, i.e. that it was the mistake which caused the transferor to enrich the 
transferee, rather than some other factor. However, when it is applied to mistaken gifts, 
the causative mistake test fails because it is being used inappropriately to address the 
separate (and logically prior) question of whether an apparent basis for enrichment is 
                                                 
42 Häcker, ‘Mistaken Gifts’ 359-371. 
43 Ibid. 363-5. 
44 This language has, of course, yet to be accepted in English law: see e.g. Lord Goff in 
Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70 at 172; Lord Hoffman in Deutsche 
Morgan Grenfell at [21]; Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 at 
[246]. For arguments that English law should adopt the civilian theory (or, more 
controversially, already has done) see e.g. Birks P., Unjust Enrichment (2nd ed., Oxford, 2006) 
chs. 5-6; Lord Walker in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell at [150]-[158].  
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valid. This question is much more complex and has a significant moral dimension: it 
cannot be answered by applying a simple, near-mechanical test. 
 
A separate test is therefore necessary, and to be effective it must be capable of 
encompassing the moral aspects of when it is fair to allow a gift to be revoked. This 
necessarily means accepting a certain amount of subjectivity and judicial discretion, 
perhaps by adopting, as in Pitt, the equitable language of unconscionability. It is further 
submitted that Lord Walker’s ‘serious mistake’ test from Pitt is preferable to the idea 
mentioned above of adding a broad ‘public policy’ exception to the causative mistake 
test: the law should be clear that merely causative mistakes are not sufficient grounds 
to invalidate a gift, rather than suggesting that they are sufficient but subject to a wide-
ranging exception. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to investigate whether there was any justification for the different 
tests for reversing mistaken transactions in equity and in unjust enrichment: having 
considered two of the possibilities, we must now offer some conclusions. Firstly, 
although there is some persuasive force to the proposed link between the stricter 
equitable test and the availability of rescission, the logic of the argument ultimately 
demands the unification of the equitable and unjust enrichment jurisdictions to produce 
a sliding scale of tests and remedies for all non-contractual mistaken transfers. This in 
turn places unbearable strain on the ‘serious mistake’ test, as the seriousness of the 
mistake becomes the arbiter of whether the claimant is entitled to a personal or 
proprietary remedy. This is deeply unsatisfying, both because the concept of 
seriousness is far too vague to provide certainty and because the concept itself lacks 
any form of underlying principle.   
 
The alternative argument that gifts need more protection than mistaken obligation 
payments is far more persuasive. The ultimate reason for this requirement is that 
mistaken gifts engage a range of moral considerations which are not appropriate in the 
commercial context of mistaken obligation payments. The result is that many mistaken 
gifts would pass the simple causative mistake test and thus be revocable despite the 
fact that, on a level of principle, we might consider the mistake in question to be 
insufficient or even to be a morally repugnant ground for offering redress. Not only do 
gifts therefore need a stricter test, but the test itself must be capable of greater nuance 
and be responsive to the individual facts of a case: whether Lord Walker’s ‘serious 
mistake’ test is the best possible solution is difficult to say, but it is submitted that his 
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Lordship was correct to insist that judges closely examine the individual case before 
them when deciding whether a mistake is so serious as to make retaining the gift 
unconscionable.  
 
To answer our original question, then, we may conclude that the substantive 
differences between the common law and equitable tests for non-contractual mistaken 
transfers are for the most part valid and justified, since the two jurisdictions are 
intended to operate in different contexts and under different principles. There are, 
however, some issues which remain to be addressed. Firstly, it is important that the 
courts should firmly reject any attempt to argue that the causative mistake test is 
appropriate when seeking to recover the value of a mistaken gift. Even though a 
claimant here would be seeking the value of the gift rather than restitution in specie, 
he is still trying to revoke a gift: the Pitt test is therefore the appropriate means of 
determining whether he should be allowed to do so (as agreed between the parties in 
Pagel v Farman and alluded to by Lord Scott in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell). Secondly, 
it is not entirely clear why the equitable jurisdiction over mistaken gifts is so willing to 
offer a successful claimant a proprietary remedy: what is the justification for allowing 
Mrs Pitt to rescind the payment into her husband’s trust, rather than allowing her only 
to recover the value transferred? This question is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
there must be a suspicion that the answer is that this is a traditional equitable 
jurisdiction and equity traditionally operated through alternative remedies (often with 
proprietary effects) such as rescission, rather than through damages. Finally, we might 
also ask the opposite question of whether there is a role to be played by rescission in 
the context of mistaken obligations cases. In particular, we might ask whether it could 
play a similar role to specific performance in contract law and allow unique or uniquely 
valuable property to be recovered in specie if a party has transferred that property 
while under the mistaken impression that he was obliged to do so. 
